This study investigates the comparative statics of an increase in risk for all risk-averse individuals with positive prudence. By extending the concept of risk dominance defined by Gollier (1995) , this study provides the necessary and sufficient conditions-termed the weaker marginal-payoffweighted risk dominance-of unambiguous comparative statics for all riskaverse individuals with positive prudence. The article further applies the concept of weaker marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominance to examine the relationship between an increase in risk and the demand for proportional insurance and to demonstrate the difference between Gollier's condition of risk dominance and weaker marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominance.
INTRODUCTION
In the early 1970s, Stiglitz (1970, 1971) were the first to study whether a risk-averse individual demands less risky assets when facing an increase in risk. Since then, other researchers (Dreze and Modigliani, 1972; Diamond and Stiglitz, 1974; Dionne and Eeckhoudt, 1987; and Briys, Dionne, and Eeckhoudt, 1989) have found conditions on the utility functions that can generate unambiguous comparative statics with a mean preserving increase in risk. Still others Hansen, 1980, 1983; Ormiston, 1983, 1985; Black and Bulkley, 1989; and Seo, 1990, 1992) have found the constraints on the increase in risk that can provide clear prediction. Gollier (1995) found the necessary and sufficient condition, a marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominance, for unambiguous comparative statics of risk increases. His theorem is very powerful because it provides the necessary and sufficient condition and, moreover, holds for all risk-averse individuals.
However, Gollier's condition may not be easily met in some cases. To make the conditions more applicable, this article intends to extend Gollier's results for risk-averse individuals with positive prudence. This article provides the necessary and sufficient conditions-termed the weaker marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominance-for unambiguous comparative statics of an increase in risk for all risk-averse individuals with positive prudence. Compared to Gollier, since the conditions in this study apply to fewer individuals, they are weaker than Gollier's condition.
This article further applies the concept of weaker marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominance to examine the relationship between an increase in risk and the demand for proportional insurance-demonstrating for the latter case the difference between Gollier's condition and weaker marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominance.
Model
We follow the notation of Gollier (1995) . Let B be a decision variable and 
The first-order condition of the problem is:
After an integration by parts, Equation (2) can be rewritten as:
where ( , , , ) ( , ) ( ) .
A marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominance defined by Gollier (1995) can be expressed as: Gollier (1995) showed that the above risk dominance is the sufficient and necessary condition for all risk-averse individuals to reduce B after the distribution of x changes
After an integration by parts again, Equation (3) can be rewritten as:
where ( , , , ) ( , ) ( , , , ) .
Assume that the individual's utility has the following characteristics: ( ( , )) 0
, and ( ( , )) 0
. Two reasons exist that explain why the individual in this study is assumed to be risk-averse with positive prudence. First, positive prudence, as defined by Kimball (1990) , is known to be a necessary condition for decreasing absolute risk aversion, as defined by Pratt (1964) , which is one of the widely accepted assumptions in the literature and highly correlated with the comparative statics of an increase in wealth (Mossin, 1968) . Second, Kimball (1990) , Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992) , and Eeckhoudt, Gollier, and Schlesinger (1996) have shown that positive prudence is essential for analyzing precautionary saving and the impact of an increase in background risk. Thus, it is worth analyzing specifically the behavior of risk-averse individuals with positive prudence with respect to an increase in risk.
Let us further define weaker marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominance as used in this study.
Definition of weaker marginal-weighted risk dominance ( ) g x . . . is called weaker marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominance on ( ) f x if and only if there exists a real scalar
It is obvious that risk-averse individuals with positive prudence are a subset of riskaverse individuals. Moreover, risk dominance, as defined by Gollier (1995) , is a sufficient condition of weaker marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominance.
Theorem 1:

After a change from ( ) f x to ( ) g x , for all risk-averse individuals with positive prudence, B is reduced if and only if ( ) g x is a weaker marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominated by
( ) f x .
Proof of Theorem 1:
The sufficiency of Theorem 1 is shown in the following section and the necessity of Theorem 1, in the Appendix.
From Equation (5),
where f B is the optimal solution of the above equation.
Thus,
It is obvious that if weaker marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominance is satisfied, then, for all risk-averse individuals with positive prudence, 
An Application to Proportional Insurance
Proportional insurance is commonly used in primary property-liability insurance to control the problem of moral hazard. Over the past decade, the property-liability insurance industry has suffered a great fluctuation in loss distributions. Thus, the effect of increases in risks and the demand for proportional insurance have attracted a great deal of attention both in the industry and in the literature. In the following section, using proportional insurance as an example, the author demonstrates the application of weaker marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominance and analyzes the comparison between the condition defined by Gollier (1995) 3 Assume that the cumulated and probability density distributions of the net wealth are ( ) F x and ( ) f x , respectively, which are transformed directly from loss distributions. Also assume that the insured chooses optimal proportional insurance to maximize his or her expected utility
Let us recall Equation (4) and follow Gollier (1995) . After an integration by parts, a distribution with cumulated density function ( ) G x is satisfied for marginal-payoffweighted risk dominance to ( ) F x if and only if there exists a real scalar H such that
If 1 H , the first (second) term in Equation (8) is related to first-(second-)order stochastic dominance. However, Gollier showed that marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominance is in general not equivalent either to first-order stochastic dominance or to second-order stochastic dominance. An interesting finding in the case of proportional insurance is that marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominance with 1 H is obviously a necessary condition of first-order stochastic dominance, which transforms only portions of the distribution under W N .
can also observe the shift of the loss distribution. The assumption is made to simplify the problem to generate a clearer comparison between marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominance and weaker marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominance. The details of this issue are discussed in Powers and Tzeng (1999) . 3 The results can be extended to other cases in which the payoff is a linear function of the random variable, such as a portfolio problem. 4 This can be stated as ( )
The risk transformation, which affects only a portion of the distribution, has also been studied by Fishburn and Porter (1976) and Eeckhoudt, Gollier, and Schlesinger (1991) .
Let us recall the definition of weaker marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominance. By the same token, a distribution is called weaker marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominance for ( ) F x if and only if there exists a real scalar H such that (9) where
Similar to Gollier's finding (1995) , weaker marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominance is generally neither second-order nor third-order stochastic dominance, although the first (second) term in Equation (9) 
CONCLUSION
This study provides the necessary and sufficient conditions-termed weaker marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominance-of unambiguous comparative statics for all risk-averse individuals with positive prudence. Compared to Gollier (1995) , since the conditions in this study apply to a subset of risk-averse individuals, weaker marginal-payoff-weighted risk dominance is shown to be a necessary condition of Gollier's condition on risk dominance and is, therefore, easier to meet. This article further uses 5 Third-order stochastic dominance, as defined by Whitmore (1970) , is shown to be the necessary and sufficient condition for all risk-averse individuals with positive prudence to prefer one risk over another. 6 This can be stated as ( 
